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In ubiquitous fashion, the best interest of the child is common to both child
support and child custody determinations. And yet formulations of what
constitutes a child’s best interest is opaque, perennially infused with cultural
permeations and societal aspirations. In practice it is more pronouncement than
application. Past influences include stereotypes of gender hierarchy, who
qualifies as a parent, the means by which parenthood may be established, and
purported goals for projected parent-child interactions. But the devil is in the
details. Amidst these influences is the concrete necessity of providing a child
with financial support. How much money is enough to provide a “minimum
decent standard of living”1 and in a manner that residential and nonresidential
parents are treated fairly.2 A child’s best interest is elusive but at a minimum it
includes, “the child’s interests in sustained growth, development, well-being,
and continuity and stability of its environment.”3
The structure of a child’s best interest consists of both physical custody and
child support. One interacts with the other to provide a trial judge a basis for
+
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1. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3.04(1)(a) (AM. L. INST. 2002).
2. Id. § 3.04(3)–(4).
3. In re Shyina B., 752 A.2d 1139, 1143 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (quoting Schult v. Schult,
699 A.2d 134, 139 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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determining the child’s overall well-being.4 State statutes permit a trial judge
wide discretion in allotting custody between parents. For example, in practice,
when a trial judge assigns one parent sole physical custody of the child, a
residential parent, this parent is likely to receive greater amounts of child support
due to that parent’s greater expenses associated with providing the child with a
residential home, food, and recreation5. The other parent, nonresidential, the
one with liberal visitation rights but without significant custody time with the
child, will be required to financially support the residential parent. Common
sense and mandated state statutory child support guidelines support this
conclusion. Likewise, if two parents share a relatively equal amount of child
physical custody—both are residential because the child spends substantially
equal time with each—logic would suggest that parental child support would
balance itself out between the two, lessening or eliminating child support from
either of the two parents. Each parent would share the home, food, and
recreation costs equally. But even if the child has two residential parents one
may have fewer economic resources than the other, hence the other parent may
be ordered to pay child support to “ensure all parties the same standard of living
if, before payment of child support, the parents had equal income.”6
Increasingly legislatures, courts and a proportion of parents favor joint
custody (residential) arrangements. Such a development is proper to modern
understanding of gender, assisted reproductive technology, and the fundamental
right of parents to raise their child. It is logical that joint custody arrangements,
many evidenced in parenting plans inaugurated by the American Law Institute,
would arise from a progression of previous custody arrangements. This Article
describes this development of custody. But while custody is more often
determined by parents with the assistance of arbitrators and mediation, child
support is neglected. Indeed, this Article argues that parents deserve the same
type of services for child support determinations as is provided for child custody
under the parenting plan structure of the American Law Institute. Anything less,
subverts the rights of both the parent and the child.
Currently child support is part of divorce or separation litigation. It is
dominated by the expectation that statutory child support guidelines provide fair
and equitable support obligations. But the guidelines are inadequate, as will be
described in this Article. And their inadequacy is contrary to the federalization
of child support, illustrated by a series of federal statutes, including the Family

4. See generally Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 668–72 (Md. 1998) (discussing the best
interest of the child standard applied to visitation).
5. See Rogers v. Rogers, 622 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. 2001).
6. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3.05(2)(a); see also id. at § 3.06(1) (“The child-support formula should grant systematic relief to
the support obligor whose income, after payment of child support at the full preliminary-assessment
percentage, is insufficient to sustain a minimum decent standard of living.”).
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Support Act of 1988.7 That Act mandated that states enact child support
guidelines, anticipating that they would provide presumptive support amounts
based on specific descriptive numeric criteria.8
But as will be illustrated,9 the guidelines often do not adequately take into
consideration the human factors involved, and often they are utilized without
proper understanding of their limitations.10 Second, even though federal law
mandates that the guidelines by reviewed at least every four years, the premises
upon which they are based may become outdated as cultural permeations evolve.
For example, some states have established trends toward a preference, even a
presumption, of joint physical custody between non-cohabiting parents.11 No
matter how joint physical custody may be defined, if such a preference or
presumption is not accommodated in the guidelines, two consequences may
result.
Third, there may arise confusion in application of the specified amount by
trial courts, resulting in an actual deficiency in providing for a child’s best
interest. This occurs, for example, when a state trial court orders a joint physical
custody arrangement between two non-cohabiting parents and then reduces one
parent’s child support obligation as a result, thinking that the two parents are
sharing the burden of support equally.12 And yet, unless both parents share equal
financial resources throughout the child’s minority, there needs to be a support
payment to ensure that the child sustains a “minimum decent standard of
living.”13
And fourth, in the highly litigious arena of divorce, child custody, and child
support, it is feasible that one parent may petition for joint physical custody

7. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988); see Linda
Henry Elrod, The Federalization of Child Support Guidelines, 6 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 103,
111 (1990) (stating that the federal law was enacted because state child support orders varied
drastically for no apparent reason).
8. § 103(a)(3), 102 Stat. at 2346; Rogers v. Rogers, 598 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Ala. Civ. App.
1992) (“An award of child support resulting from the application of the guidelines is presumed
correct.”).
9. See Serrano v. Serrano, No. 2018-CA-001888-ME, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 178
(Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2020); see discussion infra Section IV.A.
10. See, e.g., Griggs v. Griggs, 304 So. 741, 745–47 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020).
11. See, e.g., Erin Bajackson, Best Interests of the Child — A Legislative Journey Still in
Motion, 25 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 311, 323 (2013); Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Golden
Anniversary Issue, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of
Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L. Q. 381, 393 (2008) (commenting that “the last forty years have
seen various attempts to reign in judicial discretion with new presumptions, preferences, and lists
of factors” to consider).
12. See, e.g., Sutchaleo v. Sutchaleo, 228 So. 3d 475, 479–80 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017)
(illustrating that parent’s extended physical custody of the child was a sufficient reason to deviate
from the child support guidelines as long as the trial judge recorded this reason).
13. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3.0 (1)(a).
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solely in order to achieve a reduction or elimination of child support.14 Indeed,
there are those who posit that petitioning for joint physical custody is a strategy
born of the fathers’ rights movement meant to lessen child support.15 The
strategy may begin with parental separation and they initially agree to a
temporary order of joint physical custody, based on joint allegations that this
will work. Then, as litigation ensues the temporary status becomes long-lasting
and may eventually be incorporated into a final court decree.16 Once the trial
court orders joint physical custody between the parents together with an ensuing
request for equalization of child support, the order may be modified only with a
petition alleging a material change of circumstances.17 This process is costly
financially and personally.18 The new awareness of joint physical custody finds
that often women may be more willing to settle for less alimony or child support
to avoid even a small chance of losing custody of their children.19
Often detrimental to a parent with fewer resources, child support orders
remain in place while joint custody arrangements seldom last for very long.
Either because of a child’s preference to be with one parent rather than the other,
a growing disharmony between the two parents, or squabbles over newly arising
issues such as new partners, finances, or recycled grievances, the child “drifts”
into being physically with only one of the parents.20 Only the financial burden
has increased, not the child support payment, which was reduced to

14. See e.g., Lucero v. Lucero, 750 N.W.2d 377, 385 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that
Nebraska’s child support guidelines proved that when a court orders “visitation or parenting time
periods of 28 days or more in any 90-day period, support payments may be reduced by up to 80
percent, but that such determinations is made using the trial court’s discretion.”).
15. See Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family
Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79, 112 (2016) (“Growing legal coercion made child support
obligations inescapable, activists focused on achieving legal reforms that would secure
corresponding custody rights.”).
16. See Maritza Karmely, Presumption Law in Action: Why States Should Not Be Seduced
Into Adopting A Joint Custody Presumption, 30 N.D. J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321, 339, 341
(2016) (citing Nancy K. D. Lemon, Statutes Creating Rebuttable Presumptions Against Custody to
Batterers: How Effective Are They?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 601, 664 (2001)).
17. Lunney v. Lunney, 91 So. 3d 350, 355 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (stating that “there must be a
material change in circumstances affecting the child’s best interest before there can be a significant
modification of custody” (citing Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So. 2d 1193, 1194 (La. 1986)).
18. See In re Marriage of Minjares, 941 N.W.2d 604 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019) (holding that
parents’ discord at divorce and continuing afterwards did not constitute substantial change of
circumstances sufficient to modify custody).
19. See Margaret F. Brinig, Default Rules in Private and Public Law: Extending Default Rules
Beyond Purely Economic Relationships: Penalty Defaults in Family Law: The Case of Child
Custody, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 788–89 (2006).
20. See Karmely, supra note 16, at 348 (citing Mary Ann Mason, The Roller Coaster of Child
Custody Law Over the Last Half Century, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 451, 458 (2012)); see also
Brinig, supra note 19, at 784 (reporting statistics of children drifting into patterns resembling sole
physical custody with visitation); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.08(3) (supporting converting dual residence to single residence).
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accommodate joint custody.21 Invariably the child suffers the loss of “important
life opportunities.”22
It is not surprising that psychologists agree that joint physical custody is more
likely to result in a child’s positive outcome because it allows the child increased
access to both parents.23 Nonetheless, when residential time with a parent is
increased at the cost of a decrease in child support, a child will likely suffer,
most assuredly when there is a disparity in income between the two parents.24
“Economics affect children’s well-being through several mechanisms, including
its effects on family stress, time with parents (e.g., when mothers must work
more, they have less time with children), quality of parenting, and basic
resources to meet material needs.”25 Child custody is inextricably connected
with child support and while significant attention is focused on custody, the
same cannot be said of child support. The same level of parental participation
that goes into a custody parenting plan must be expended on formulating a child
support plan. Parents need to be encouraged, assisted, and compelled to initiate
support plans that are isolated from gender stereotypes, committed to personal
practical possibilities, and not reliant on state modification or enforcement.
First, this Article traces the evolution of parenthood to provide a sense of each
parent’s constitutional importance. A parent’s right—an expanded definition of
who constitutes parents—to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of his or her child is now grounded in the Constitution’s Due Process
Clause.26 In addition to biological parents, now there are expanding procedures
to recognize parentage claims by adoptive parents, nonmarital partners, samesex partners, stepparents, estoppel parents, de-facto parents, and parentage
occurring through assisted reproductive technology (ART).27 Among these
ART possibilities are posthumous conception, surrogacy contracts, and intended
parents occasioned by gamete donations. The expansive nature of parental
21. See Karmely, supra note 16, at 348–53.
22. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3.04(2).
23. See, e.g., Karmely, supra note 16, at 363 (“[The] social policy argument [is] that the best
interest of the child is served when both parents are involved in the child’s life.”); CHRISTY M.
BUCHANAN, ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & SANFORD M. DORNBUSCH, ADOLESCENTS AFTER
DIVORCE 66–67 (1996).
24. See Christy M. Buchanan & Parissa L. Jahromi, The Best Interests of the Child: Article &
Empirical Study: A Psychological Perspective on Shared Custody Arrangements, 43 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 419, 432 (2008).
25. Id. at 420–21.
26. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 77
(2000) (Souter, J., concurring); but see Raymond C. O’Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process
Rights of Children Versus Parents, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1209, 1247–56 (1994). The American Law
Institute defines a legal parent, a parent by estoppel, and a de facto parent. See PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 cmts. a–c; Id. at §
2.04(1).
27. See generally Raymond C. O’Brien, Marital Versus Nonmarital Entitlements, 45 ACTEC
L. J. 79, 140–42 (2020).
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claims, based on heightened awareness of the fundamental nature of parentage,
supports greater scrutiny of custody and attendant support considerations. The
fundamental Due Process right guarantees equality of treatment irrespective of
gender, race, physical handicap, or religious practices.28 As a consequence,
legislation and judicial pronouncements emphasize joint decision-making,
jointly drafted parenting plans, and custodial responsibility for modification and
initiation. Arguably the same should be apply to child support.
Second, this Article explains the evolution of child custody arrangements and
how this comports with an evolving understanding of parenthood.29 Each
historical permeation was intended to satisfy the best interest of the child, a
consistent standard throughout. Today, both parents are often employed outside
the home, both parents are presumptively required to support their children, and
imputed income may be assigned without regard to gender.30 These features are
required in state child support guidelines.31 As child custody arrangements
evolved child support assessment did too. Distinctively, modern child support
requirements result from a series of federal requirements, prompting states to
issue statutory guidelines, establish obligation, enforce payments, and punish
those who fail to pay. But the federalization of child support comes at a cost.
The focus of state legislatures is on complying with federal mandates, often
ignoring the practical elements of child support. Among these elements are the
increasing incidence of joint custody petitions, the retaliatory effect of domestic
abuse allegations, the surrender of support to maximize custody, and the socially
fluid nature of custody and support.
Third, this Article discusses child support, why it originated and how it has
become federalized. The argument is made that state child support has become
so besotted with federal compliance that states have neglected the local nature
of child support, its connection with child custody, its fluidity, and its connection
with the best interest of the child. State-sanctioned mathematical child support
guidelines often do not recognize the economic consequences of a child
physically occupying two different homes for a comparable amount of time.32
Guideline worksheets, forced to classify parents as “custodial parent” or
“noncustodial parent,” “residential parent” or “nonresidential parent” do not
actually accommodate joint physical custody with relatively equal parenting
28. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.12(1) (Criteria for Parenting Plan—Prohibited Factors).
29. See Raymond C. O’Brien, Obergefell’s Impact on Functional Families, 66 CATH. U. L.
REV. 363, 379–87 (2016).
30. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.15 (imputing income to the residential parent in computing child support
awards).
31. O’Hara v. O’Hara, No. 2017-CA-001643-ME, 2018 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 925, at *5
(Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2018) (“The child support guidelines require each party to pay their
proportionate share of support without consideration of gender.”).
32. See, e.g., Serrano v. Serrano, No. 2018-CA-001888-ME, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS
178 (Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2020); see discussion infra Section III.A.
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time.33 Furthermore, support guidelines are based on false assumptions, and
their inability to adjust to fluid physical custody changes invariably render them
inadequate or worse, unjust. Having statutory guidelines are not sufficient, there
must be more, there must be parental involvement in child support similar to
what occurs with child custody awards.
This Article concludes that mandated child support guidelines are a permanent
fixture of child support. But guidelines are the beginning of the child support
assessment, not the end. Guidelines must be reviewed at least every four years
and review should be attentive to the changing nature of custody arrangements
and incorporate more practical worksheets. So too, parents need to be more
involved in the review of the guidelines themselves, the manner and frequency
of modification, and the integration of realistic support with realistic custody.
To achieve this, courts should order that services be provided to parents so that
they may establish support plans similar to parenting plans.34 The federalization
of child support has lessened local and personal attention on the practical aspects
of child support. Rebutting the guidelines with individual circumstances is
simply not enough. The truth of the matter is that child support is just as
important as child custody to the best interest of the child. The two are
interrelated and that is the point of this Article.
I. EVOLUTION OF PARENTHOOD
In 2015, the Supreme Court held that neither the states nor the federal
government could deprive same-sex couples of the fundamental right to marry.35
Whatever anyone may think of the Court’s holding, the Court acknowledged that
a nation’s understanding of what constitutes a fundamental right may evolve.36
“[R]ights come not from ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better
informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that
remains urgent in our own era.”37 Today—any day—when we posit the
fundamental right of a parent to the care, custody and control of his or her child,
this right arises from historical precedent and evolving social underpinnings.
A. Parentage as Fundamental
The importance of child custody derives from the fundamental nature of
parenthood itself. When any person asserts a right to child custody, support,
visitation, or even parentage itself, that person claims a status that is strictly

33. Serrano, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 178, at *17–19 (in part citing the lower court’s
opinions).
34. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.07.
35. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015).
36. Id. at 669.
37. Id. at 671–72.
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scrutinized and protected against all but compelling state purposes.38 There are
innumerable references in judicial opinions upholding the fundamental right of
a parent to raise his or her child.39 This fundamentality rests upon a platform, a
history, of an evolving group of “preferred” rights.40 These “preferred rights”
were identified as “particular forms of expression, action, or opportunity
perceived as touching more deeply and permanently on human personality.” 41
Among these are rights to travel,42 to vote,43 protection from racial
classifications,44 and a liberty interest that includes a right to essential services,45
intimate conduct,46 and marriage.47
The fundamental liberty interest of parents to raise their children is one of the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Supreme Court.48
State legislatures were gradual when codifying the presumptive ability of both
parents to raise his or her child, with one specifying that “there shall be no primafacie right to the custody of the child in the father or mother.”49 But such modern
envelopments are the result of cultural developments argued and purchased in
recent decades. The same may be said of same-sex parents, surrogate parents,
de facto parents, and intentional parents. All of these have enhanced the
understanding of a parent’s fundamental right to the care, custody, and control
of his or her child. Parenthood is fundamental.

38. Id. at 667.
39. See, e.g., id. (“[Marriage] safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from
related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60
(2000) (“fundamental right of parents to rear their children”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
753 (1982) (“fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management
of their child”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 (1972) (“important interests of both parent
and child”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (“traditional interest of parents with
respect to the religious upbringing of their children”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(discussing the right to “establish a home and bring up children”).
40. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
41. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 770 (2d ed. 1988).
42. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).
43. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
44. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484 (1982).
45. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 214, 230 (1982) (“The state may not make illegal
immigrants a ‘subclass of illiterates’ by prohibiting them from attending school.”).
46. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty presumes an autonomy
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression and certain intimate conduct.”).
47. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015).
48. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923)); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 165 (1944); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citations omitted); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
49. See GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-9-3 (2019).
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B. Gender Neutrality
There was a time when the father of the child was thought to own his children,
the value of their services, and the right to their custody in the father’s declining
years. Then a shift in the gender paradigm occurred, the custody rights of a
father, most particularly a father not married to the child’s mother, were
considered as minimal or nonexistent.50 The mother gradually was accorded
presumptive rights. First, by establishing a tender-years presumption that
presumptively awarded physical custody of a child to the child’s mother if the
child was of tender years.51 But as women entered the workforce more often
and courts began applying equal protection scrutiny, there developed a shift
towards both natural parents having the constitutional right to custody of their
children.”52 Presumptively child custody was henceforth gender neutral.
Gender neutrality is required by the American Law Institute’s Principles of
Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations.53 The Principles
lists factors that may not be considered when making a custody determination,
such as a consideration of “the sex of a parent or of the child,”54 which is in
accord with the goals of minimizing reliance on stereotypes, preserving diversity
in parenting arrangements, and focusing on the Principles’ goal of planning for
the child’s needs.55 Similarly, the 2017 revision of the Uniform Law
Commission’s Uniform Parentage Act was proposed in part to provide gender
neutral terms, specifically to ensure equal treatment of children born to samesex couples.56 The Act creates the mechanism by which parentage may be
established and therefore it pertains to child custody determinations too.57

50. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding that an unwed father is
entitled to a parental fitness hearing under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause).
51. See, e.g., Gilliland v. Gilliland, 969 So. 2d 56, 66 (Miss. App. Ct. 2007) (defining the
presumption as an assumption that, when a child is of such a tender age, custody should be awarded
to the mother until child reaches an age when it can be equally cared for by the other parent); State
ex. rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 290 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973) (holding tender-years
presumption a violation of equal protection and stating that “[l]egislative classification may
legitimately take account of need or ability; they may not be premised on unalterable sex
characteristics that bear no necessary relationship to the individual’s need, ability or life
situation.”).
52. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 661 (Burger, J., dissenting); see also Gender Fairness Implementation
Comm’n, Gender Fairness in North Dakota’s Courts: A Ten-Year Assessment, 83 N.D. L. REV.
309, 334 (2007) (finding there was no clear gender bias found but there was a perception of bias).
53. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW. OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.12(1)(b)
54. See id.
55. Id. § I2 II.
56. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). “To the extent
practicable, a provision of this [act] applicable to a father-child relationship applies to a motherchild relationship and a provision of this [act] applicable to a mother-child relationship applies to a
father-child relationship.” Id. § 107.
57. See O’Brien, Obergefell’s Impact on Functional Families, supra note 29, at 379–81.
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Despite advocacy for gender neutrality, the perception, and perhaps the
reality, of gender discrimination persists. The recent ascendency of joint
physical child custody is due in part to “dissatisfaction with the legal treatment
of divorced fathers who, supporters believed, seldom won custody under the
ostensibly gender-neutral best-interests standard.”58 Among issues singled out
as receiving disparate legal treatment are petitions by custodial mothers to
change the name of the child, the mother’s relocation of the child, and the
mother’s ability to restrict third-party access to the child, often the father’s
parents.59
Increasingly, fathers’ rights advocates protested that post-divorce restrictions
on noncustodial fathers’ access to their children was gender discriminatory and
diminished the parent-child relationship, hence was not in the best interest of the
child.60 In addition, they argued, the nonresidential fathers were required to
support this discrimination with a substantial financial child support obligation.
Cost and denial of access to their children fostered resentment in many fathers.61
And child support could no longer be taken lightly. Federal mandates compelled
states to be aggressive in enforcement through wage-withholding, passport
refusals, and civil or criminal incarceration.62 Faced with what was perceived
as discrimination and financial compulsion fathers organized to promote
legislation that ensures greater access to child custody.63 Thus, “[i]n legislatures
across the country, men’s groups have promoted joint-custody legislation,
returning year after year in some states to lobby for favorable laws. The efforts
have been intensive—including testimony, letter-writing and email campaigns,
media-advertising campaigns, blogging, and the placement of news stories,
editorials, and op-eds.”64
“Joint-custody campaigns have encountered stiff opposition in most states
from coalitions of opponents including, most prominently, advocates for
mothers.”65 Advocates for mothers “have effectively promoted statutory
provisions categorically disfavoring the parent who has violently threatened
either his child or the other parent. In response, fathers’ groups have sought to
weaken these laws while urging lawmakers (also successfully) to emphasize
parental alienation as a key factor in the custody decision.”66
58. Katharine T. Bartlett & Elizabeth S. Scott, Gender Politics and Child Custody: The
Puzzling Persistence of the Best Interest Standard, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 77 (2014)
[hereinafter Bartlett & Scott] (citations omitted).
59. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
60. Bartlett & Scott, supra, note 58 at 71–72.
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62. See Weinstein v. Albright, 261 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2001).
63. Dinner, supra note 15, at 107–10.
64. Id. One of the reasons for the rejection of the primary caretaker presumption of custody
was that it seemingly preferred mothers over fathers. Michael Abramowicz & Sarah Abramowicz,
Bifurcating Settlements, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 376, 399 (2018).
65. Bartlett & Scott, supra note 58, at 78.
66. Id. at 83 (citations omitted).
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Beneath the accusations is the gender stereotype of the father committing
domestic violence against the mother, with the corresponding gender stereotype
of the mother alienating the children from the father. Besides being based in
gender, both allegations “rest on private family information that might be
difficult for a court to verify.”67 The American Law Institute provides for acute
investigation of violence or abusive behavior through the appointment of a
guardian ad litem, an attorney to represent the child, or a neutral person or
agency.68 And, of course, any court should have the discretion to interview the
child, or to appoint another to do so.69
Interestingly, modern proposals suggested by the American Law Institute
advocate that couples themselves address gender when formulating parenting
plans with the help of mediators.70 Or, as an alternative to parenting plans, an
allocation of custodial responsibility under an approximation schedule.71
Professor Elizabeth S. Scott defines a custody sharing arrangement as an
allocation of custody “proportionately between the parents on the basis of the
caretaking roles they had while the family was intact.”72 As such, and consistent
with the objectives of the American Law Institute, the “parents continue to share
decision-making authority and each parents’ allocation of physical custody is
determined on the basis of the family’s past practices.”73 Fathers, Professors
Bartlett’s and Scott’s research suggests, perform about one-third of child care.74
Gender is most often thought of in the context of mother and father, man, and
woman, but assisted reproductive technology has widened the scope of gender.
Two persons of the same sex can now become parents to a child and still share
a genetic connection. Likewise, a single person can intend to become a parent
through a surrogacy contract, and genome editing now makes it possible for
more than two persons to make a direct genetic contribution to a child that they
can now assert is their own. It seems that as we seek to make gender irrelevant,

67. Id. at 89. Parental alienation occurs when one parent disparages the other to the children
in order to alienate the children from the other parent. See, e.g., Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290,
1291, 1293 (Fla. 1991) (holding that mother was ordered to say good things about the father to
reverse her parental alienation).
68. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.13; see also id. § 2.11 (protection of family member from violence); see
also id. § 2.05(2)(f) (parenting plan requires description of violent circumstances); see also id. §
2.05(3) (court must have a screening process to identify domestic violence); see also id. § 2.07(2)
(requiring mediators to screen for domestic violence); see also id. at § 2.07(3) (precluding
involuntary face-to-face mediation).
69. Id. § 2.14.
70. See id. § 2.05.
71. Id. § 2.08.
72. Bartlett & Scott, supra note 58, at 101.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Suzanne Bianchi, Maternal Employment and Time with Children: Dramatic
Change or Surprising Continuity?, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 401, 411 (2000)).
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it becomes increasingly relevant to fashioning parenthood and resulting child
custody claims.
C. Assisted Reproductive Technology
In 1978 a baby, Louise Joy Brown, was conceived and born as a result of
assisted reproductive technology (ART), specifically in vitro fertilization
(IVF).75 This was a revolutionary development at the time, but today an
increasing percentage of the populations in the United States and throughout the
world are using assisted reproduction in their pursuit of parenthood: “Perhaps as
much as 12% of the white female population [in the United States] between the
ages of 35 and 44, who also have at least a bachelor’s degree, have used [it].”76
This is true even though the significant cost of ART is not covered by medical
insurance. Data collected from fertility clinics located throughout the United
States illustrate the increased use of assisted reproduction:
In 2013, the [National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and
Health Promotion, Division of Reproductive Health] collected data
from 467 fertility clinics then in operation and able to verify data
submitted. These clinics reported in 2013, that the number of ART
cycles performed in the United States increased 25% from 2004 to
2013, for a total of 190,773 ART cycles performed in 2013. From
these cycles ‘[t]he number of infants born who were conceived using
ART increased from 59,458 in 2004 to 66,706 in 2013.’ The CDC
reports that in 2013 approximately 1.5% of all infants born in the
United States were conceived using some form of ART.77
The rapid utilization of assisted reproduction is significant because “for the
first time in history, it is now possible for a baby to have more than two genetic
parents.”78 Traditionally persons could increase parentage options through statesanctioned statutory adoption, including most recently stepparent adoption.
Today, through the use of ever-expanding medical technologies, a parent-child
75. The term ART means any medical or scientific technology or method designed to assist
one or more persons to cause a pregnancy through means other than by sexual intercourse. See
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(4) (including “intrauterine or intracervical insemination; . . .
donation of gametes; . . . donation of embryos; . . . in vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos;
and . . . intracytoplasmic sperm injection.”).
76. Hallie A. Hamilton, Note, Three-Parent Babies and FDA Jurisdiction: The Case for
Regulating Three-Party In Vitro Fertilization as a Drug Biologic, 53 CREIGHTON L. REV. 427, 433
n.46 (2020) (citing Gretchen Livingston, A Third of U.S. Adults Say They Have Used Fertility
Treatments or Know Someone Who Has, PEW. RES. CTR. (July 17, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/17/a-third-of-u-s-adults-say-they-have-used-fertility-treatmentsor-know-someone-who-has/).
77. Raymond C. O’Brien, Assessing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 27 CATH. U. J. OF L.
& TECH. 1, 10–11 (2018) (citing to Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013 Assisted
Reproductive
Technology:
National
Summary
Report
CDC
1,
3
(2015),
ftp:://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/art/ART-2013-Clinic-Report-Full.pdf).
78. Id. at 49.
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relationship may now occur through surrogacy, contract intentionality, estoppel,
and coupled with the use of artificial insemination, posthumous conception, and
mitochondrial transfer.79 Enlarging the scope of parentage prompts the issue: if
a parent has a fundamental right to custody or visitation with a child, who
constitutes a parent in this modern age?
Symbolic of modern availability of parentage, in 2017 the Uniform Parentage
Act was amended to accommodate same-sex couples, who are increasingly
utilizing ART to become parents.80 State laws, like the Uniform Parentage Act,
have had to catchup to societal changes. For example, when a female same-sex
married couple gave birth to a child through the use of artificial insemination
and a donor sperm, they attempted to place both of their names on the child’s
birth certificate as legal parents.81 But a state statute provided that the state did
not have to issue a birth certificate to the female spouse of a woman who gave
birth in the state.82 When the state statute was challenged, the Supreme Court
of the United States held that the state statute was unconstitutional because it
denied same-sex married couples equality of treatment with opposite-sex
married couples.83 The decision is a recent illustration of the fundamental right
of a parent that cannot be conditioned upon gender, including sexual orientation.
There are two other ways that the parameters of parentage may be expanded.
First, even though an individual has no genetic relationship with a child, if that
“individual resided in the same household with the child for the first two years
of the life of the child, including any period of temporary absence, and openly
held out the child as the individual’s child[,]” then that individual is presumed
to a parent of that child.84 The “intentionality” of the individual is the deciding
factor in becoming, in the terms of the American Law Institute, a parent by
estoppel or a de facto parent.85 And second, if an individual consents in writing,
or by clear and convincing evidence, to assisted reproduction with the intent to

79. See Raymond C. O’Brien, The Immediacy of Genome Editing and Mitochondrial
Replacement, 9 WAKE FOREST J. OF L. & POL’Y, 419, 491 (2019). A baby boy was born in Mexico
City on April 6, 2016 after removing nuclear DNA from the target egg’s defective mtDNA and
placing it within a donated egg with healthy mtDNA. The nuclear DNA of the donated egg is
similarly removed so that the healthy mtDNA is the only contribution made by the donor, but a
genetic contribution, nonetheless. Id. at 470.
80. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 107 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017).
81. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2078–79 (citing the holding in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)); see
also Henderson v. Box, 947 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that “after Obergefell and
Pavan, a state cannot presume that a husband is the father of a child born in wedlock, while denying
an equivalent presumption to parents in same-sex marriages.”).
84. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2); see O’Brien, Obergefell’s Impact on Functional
Families, supra note 29, at 400–02; see also PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 (establishing both a parent by estoppel at cmt. (b), and
a de facto parent at cmt. (c)).
85. PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03.
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be a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction, then that person is a
parent of the child.86
Surrogacy has been available for a long time, an early form of ART. There
are currently two options. First, what is referenced as genetic surrogacy is
mentioned in Hebrew Scripture.87 It is a practice whereby a woman agrees to
become pregnant and carry the child to term using her own gamete (egg) and
donor sperm.88 Modern genetic surrogacy does not require intercourse as was
the case in the time of the Bible, it may be achieved through artificial
insemination.89 The older practice involved a man seeking a child with a woman
other than his wife, usually prompted by the wife’s inability to conceive a child.
Compare genetic surrogacy with the second form of surrogacy, gestational
surrogacy. This is a modern development that involves a more advanced form
of assisted reproduction.90 Most often gestational surrogacy involves both a
donated egg and sperm, either from the parties themselves or purchased from an
expanding list of fertility clinics. Conception occurs outside the surrogate
herself, the egg fertilized with the sperm in a medical laboratory. Then, after
conception, a fertilized egg—an embryo—is then placed in the surrogate who
then carries the fetus to term, surrendering the infant to the intended parents after
birth.
Surrogacy may involve at a minimum five adult persons: the two donors, two
parents, and one surrogate. State statutes outline the parameters of any
enforceable surrogacy agreement. It must specify interests of all involved,
including the spouse of the surrogate, spouses of donors, and spouses of the
intended parents.91 In spite of the increasing use of national and international
surrogacy, there continues to be hesitancy regarding surrogacy92 and court

86. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 703–04; see, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 280, 282, 293 (1998) (holding that a man or woman consenting to an act that brings a child
into being is a parent of that resulting child); see also In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144 (Ill.
2003) (finding that the Illinois Parentage Act does not bar common law theories of parentage in the
absence of written consent).
87. See Genesis 16:1–16; see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(1).
88. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(1).
89. Id.
90. See id. § 801(2).
91. See, e.g., id. § 804.
92. See, e.g., Rachel Wexler, Artificial Reproductive Technology and Gendered Notions of
Parenthood After Obergefell: Analyzing the Legal Assumptions That Shaped the Baby M Case and
the Hodge-Podge Nature of Current Surrogacy Law, 27 TUL. J. L. & SEXUALITY 1, 3–4 (2018)
(discussing state statutes restricting or outlawing surrogacy); Tara R. Melillo, Gene Editing and the
Rise of Designer Babies, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 757, 758 (2017) (discussing designer babies);
See generally Deborah S. Mazer, Born Breach: The Challenge of Remedies in Surrogacy Contracts,
28 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM, 211, 215 (2016) (discussing surrogacy contract enforcement); Jessica
M. Camano, International, Commercial, Gestational Surrogacy Through the Eyes of Children Born
to Surrogates in Thailand: A Cry for Legal Attention, 96 B. U. L. REV. 571, 572 (2016) (discussing
problems with international surrogacy).
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decisions regarding validity of surrogacy contracts vary.93 Embedded in the
judicial and legislative debate is the issue of who qualifies as a parent of the
child of ART? “Do all parents, whatever their numbers, acquire equal parental
standing, with equal liability for child support and equal standing to seek custody
and visitation?”94 This issue is still debated in the context of parental rights. But
there are those who argue that parentage during this age of ART must be viewed
hierarchically, with primary parents, those making a substantial genetic
contribution, receiving physical custody awards.95
Hierarchical entitlement to custody seems particularly pertinent in the context
of mitochondrial replacement, a newer and another form of ART. The process
includes a procedure during which embryos are modified and then “result in
offspring with genetic material from three different persons, including two
women of different maternal lineage.”96 As science develops, even more
parental status claims may emerge. Certainly, the development—and
acceptance of—ART will affect the way that we view parental status, rights, and
responsibilities. As with the evolution of fundamental rights and gender
neutrality, ART will influence policy and practice.
II. EVOLUTION OF CUSTODY ARRANGEMENTS
A. One Parent, Father or Mother
As Lewis Carroll aptly advised: “Begin at the beginning . . . and go on till you
come to the end: then stop.”97 Hence we must acknowledge that in the English
courts of the Nineteenth Century, in the few cases of divorce and awarding
custody of children that came before judges, the child’s father was entitled to
custody unless he was found to have committed a grave act of immorality.98 But
this rule did not emigrate from England to America. Instead, courts in the United
States applied a best interest standard and “awarded” custody of the child to one

93. See, e.g., P.M. v. T.B., 907 N.W.2d 522, 533–34 (Iowa 2018) (holding that the surrogacy
agreement did not violate public policy); Rosecky v. Schissel, 833 N.W.2d 634, 652–53 (Wis.
2013) (holding that there was no state public policy objection to enforcing a genetic surrogacy
agreement as long as it is in the best interests of the child). For a survey of surrogacy laws, see
Surrogacy Laws, THE SURROGACY EXPERIENCE, https://www.the surrogacyexperience.com/u-ssurrogacy-law-by-state.html.
94. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Changing American State and Federal Childcare Laws:
Parents, Babies, and More Parents, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 9, 10 (2017).
95. Id. at 46.
96. O’Brien, The Immediacy of Genome Editing and Mitochondrial Replacement, supra note
79, at 471; G. Owen Schaefer & Markus K. Labude, Genetic Affinity and the Right to ‘Three-Parent
IVF’, 34 J. ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 1577, 1577 (2017).
97. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 110 (1865).
98. See, e.g., King v. De Manneville (1804) 102 Eng. Rep. 1054–55 (KB); Shelley v.
Westbrooke, (1817) 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch); see also LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND
MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500–1800, 667–69 (1977).
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or the other parent, most likely the mother.99 Courts at that time concluded that
one parent, not both, would provide more permanency for the child and
furthermore, since the father was more likely to work outside of the home, the
mother was the logical choice for custody of the child.100 Recall that until 1979,
many states had statutes that permitted alimony to be paid only from husbands
to former wives.101 Because the former wife had the promise of financial support
from her husband until her remarriage or death, coupled with domestic
characteristics courts thought advantageous to children, the mother consistently
received custody.
Maternal preference for custody became known as the tender years
presumption, which presumes that “in all cases where any child is of such tender
age as to require the mother’s care for the child’s physical welfare, the child
should be awarded to her custody, at least until the child reaches that age and
maturity where the child can be equally well cared for by other persons.”102 By
1925, the maternal tender years presumption was characteristic of custody
awards throughout the United States but gradually, by the middle of the
twentieth century, many women and mothers became more independent, both
economically and socially.103 Many worked outside the family home, making
women more on par with their husbands when it came to availability for child
care. By the time California became the first state to adopt no-fault divorce in
1969, an increasing number of women were working outside the home. Other
states quickly adopted no-fault divorce and gradually there were parallel changes
to laws affecting division of property, alimony, and child support
distributions.104 “As late as 1970, 40% of American families met the model of

99. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
100. See generally Dinner, supra note 15, at 81–82; Jay Einhorn, Child Custody in Historical
Perspective: A Study of Changing Social Perceptions of Divorce and Child Custody in AngloAmerican Law, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 119, 125 (1986); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the
Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1984).
101. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279, 283 (1979) (holding that state statutes that permit
alimony only from the husband to the wife violates Equal Protection).
102. Benal v. Benal, 22 So. 3d 369, 373 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the trial court did
not err when awarding custody of child to the child’s mother).
103. See, e.g., Bozman v. Bozman, 830 A.2d 450, 496–97 (Md. 2003) (abolishing the marital
tort exception); Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 226 (Ga. 1985) (abolishing the marital rape
exception); State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 232 (Mo. 1982) (permitting ex parte
orders for domestic violence); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (women had a bodily privacy
right to obtain an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (a single woman had the
same right as a married woman to possession of contraceptives); Stuart v. Bd. of Supervisors of
Elections, 295 A.2d 223, 227–28 (Md. 1972) (a woman had a right to retain her birth name).
104. See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of
Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 990 (1995) (discussing division of property and child
support); Jana B. Singer, Symposium on Divorce and Feminist Theory: Alimony and Efficiency:
The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L. J. 2423,
2423 (1994) (discussing validity of “economic justifications for alimony”).
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one wage earner, a stay-at-home-wife, and two children; today less than one in
four families do.”105
In spite of the modern perception of equal economic self-sufficiency between
both parents, when awarding child custody, mothers continued to
disproportionately receive custody of their children.106 Consistently, statistics
illustrate that children are most often awarded to the sole physical custody of
their mothers.107 Women continue to have access to the workforce, yet they also
are perceived as possessing advantageous skills in providing a child with
emotional stability and security.108 And not only judges, but guardians ad litem
(GAL), while protesting the use of the tender years presumption, nonetheless
recommend that the mother be awarded custody because the GAL is simply “old
fashioned.”109 Furthermore, statutory factors determining what is meant by the
best interest of the child are often weighed in such a fashion that they favor
activities normally performed by mothers.110 Hence, while the tender years
presumption may explicitly be rejected by statute or by judicial decision,111 in
practice mothers disproportionately are awarded sole physical custody of the
child and fathers awarded liberal visitation.
Sensing gender discrimination, male activist groups formed in the 1960s
arguing that “social and legal construction of gender roles, far from
subordinating women, oppressed men.”112 They pointed to “the fact that only
three percent of fathers received physical custody of their children upon divorce
[and this] established prima facie proof of sex discrimination.”113 The legal and
cultural milieu of activism in the 1960s and 1970s provided a base for arguments
of gender discrimination, equal protection, due process, and privacy. State
legislators were attentive, and this is reflected in an evolution of custody,
summarized as follows:
105. Elrod & Dale, supra note 11, at 386.
106. Julie E. Artis, Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges’ Accounts of the Tender
Years Doctrine, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 769, 770–71 (2004).
107. See Elizabeth Gresk, Opposing Viewpoints: Best Interests of the Child vs. The Fathers’
Rights Movement, 33 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 390, 390 (2013).
108. See, e.g., Co v. Matson, 313 P.3d 521, 529 (Alaska 2013) (dismissing use of tender years
and using factors under best interest of child standard).
109. See, e.g., In re Van Dorn, No. 5-18-0234, 2018 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2110, at *13–15
(App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2018).
110. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Montgomery, 20 So. 3d 39, 44 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009); Lackey
v. Fuller, 755 So. 2d 1083, 1089 (Miss. 2000) (“The [tender] age of the child is simply one of the
factors we consider in determining the best interests of the child.”).
111. See State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 290 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973) (holding
that the presumption runs afoul of Equal Protection guarantees); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE &
DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9 U.L.A. 282 (1998) (codifying best interest of the child without reference to
gender); but see Ramsay Laing Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335,
335–37 (1982) (arguing that the doctrine better protects the best interest of the child).
112. Dinner, supra note 15, at 88.
113. Id. at 114 (citing Letter from Carlo E. Abbruzzese, Chairman, Family Law Action
Council, to the President of the United States (n.d.) (on file with MFM Online, MEN Int’l)).
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In the late 1970s, the prevailing doctrine was that the best interests of
the child would be served by awarding sole custody to the parent who
had served as the primary caretaker. By the mid-1980s, nearly twothirds of states recognized that joint custody could sometimes be in the
best interests of the child. Between 1979 and 1982, twenty-one states
passed joint custody statutes; these ranged in the strength of their
preference from merely making joint custody an option available to
the court to a presumption in favor of it. By 1984, thirty-two states
recognized joint custody in some form, and several more states
followed suit in the late 1980s. Many of these statutes went beyond
legal recognition to create a presumption that joint custody served the
best interests of the child. A study by political scientist Herbert Jacob
surveyed twenty-six states that passed joint custody statutes; fathers’
rights groups campaigned actively in fourteen of them.114
The culture of the times, the rising influence of men’s activist groups, and the
ascendency of strict enforcement of child support obligations contributed to
increased petitions for joint physical custody. “Fathers’ rights activists
supported strong presumptions in favor of joint custody at the state level,
coupled with minimal federal involvement in child support.”115 And at the same
time, “women’s rights activists supported joint custody statutes only when
parents agreed to this arrangement, and insisted on a powerful federal child
support enforcement apparatus.”116 Many fathers and the groups that
represented them thought of this system as unfair. They viewed no-fault divorce
as a means by which a father who had committed no marital fault, could
nonetheless be deprived of his children because the mother petitioned for
divorce and was then awarded sole physical custody of the couple’s children.
And furthermore, fathers were then obligated to pay enforceable child support
to the mother who now has sole physical custody of their children.117 And while
it is arguable that fathers sought joint physical custody to lessen child support
obligations, one commentator disputes this, writing that “[c]onsiderable
evidence exists demonstrating that activists sincerely wanted divorced fathers to
play greater caregiving roles in their children’s daily lives”118 through joint
physical custody. Or, at a minimum, states should enforce visitation orders with
similar fervor to enforcement of child support.
Reviewing custody arrangements, we can conclude that gender, and the
stereotypes associated with each, was often determinative in assigning child
custody. But increasingly, financial resources obtained through employment or
114. Id. at 121–22 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 123.
116. Id. Federal involvement in the collection of child support became more pronounced after
passage of the Child Support Enforcement Amendments Act of 1984, which provided financial
incentives to states to enforce collection of child support from parents. Id. at 138.
117. Id. at 121.
118. Id. at 124–26.
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through stricter enforcement of child support became determinative. And
throughout any custody dispute, the mother and the father were viewed as
litigants by legislators and courts, the state trial courts serving as final arbiter on
what is best for the child. Eventually the focus will be on ways to avoid gender
stereotypes, but the state trial court continues to be the arbiter between two
litigants.
B. Primary Caretaker Presumption
Seeking to avoid the gender inequality of the tender years presumption, but
nonetheless hoping for an easier way—a presumptive way—to resolve custody
disputes between two equal parents, a few states adopted what is known as the
primary caretaker presumption.119 Chief Justice Neely of the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals formulated the parameters of who constitutes a
child’s “primary caretaker” by identifying which parent has taken responsibility
for:
(1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and
dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical
care, including nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for social
interaction among peers after school, i.e. transporting to friends’
houses or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings; (6) arranging
alternative care, i.e. babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed
at night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in
the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners and toilet
training; (9) educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc.; and, (10)
teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing and arithmetic.120
There were immediate concerns about using a presumption of primary
caretaker for an award of custody. Some argued that it conditioned primary
status on only certain duties, not ones such as earning outside employment
119. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360, 363 (W. Va. 1981) (holding that a court must
give positive consideration to the parent who has been a primary caretaker for the child); see also
High v. High, 697 S.E.2d 690, 700 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that there is an assumption that
child custody will be awarded to primary caretaker); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(6) (2019) (“the
history and nature of each parent’s participation in providing care for the child”).
120. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363. Compare these functions with what is deemed necessary when
any parent has custody of a child:
Parenting functions are defined to include maintaining a safe, stable, consistent, and
nurturing relationship with the child; attending to the child’s ongoing developmental
needs, including feeding, clothing, grooming, emotional stability, and appropriate
conflict resolution skills; attending to adequate education for the child; assisting the child
in maintaining a safe, positive, and appropriate relationship with each parent and other
family members; minimizing the child’s exposure to harmful parental conflict; assisting
the child in developing skills to maintain safe, positive, and appropriate interpersonal
relationships; and exercising support for social, academic, athletic, or other special
interests.
State v. Jeffrey T., 932 N.W.2d 692, 704 (Neb. 2019) (citing the NEB. PARENTING ACT § 432922(17)).
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wages so as to support the family.121 Others argued that primary caretaker roles
do not adequately accommodate the changes in the modern family. The point
being that instead of caretaking, it would be better to use an approximation
standard. That is, to the extent possible, custody should be awarded in a manner
that approximates the role of each parent in the child’s life.122 Some
commentators are willing to provide the primary caretaker presumption with a
slim preference when compared to everything else that is proposed.123 And yet
consistent among all commentators is the suggestion that both parents work
jointly to achieve a custody arrangement that, at least initially, avoids litigation.
A summary of this suggestion is that:
[W]hen a divorce is contemplated, parents should make a sincere
effort to solve the problems of child custody themselves, thereby
placing a high premium on family privacy and autonomy. But when
there are insoluble conflicts which the couple cannot solve privately
or through mediation, the couple must go to court. In such cases . . . a
judge ought to approach child custody disputes from the vantage of
the needs of the child based on the child’s particular age, attachments,
and stage of development. Additionally, the judge should consider the
adult who can satisfy those needs best.124
While the primary caretaker presumption gained few adherents, it did initiate
a new emphasis on joint efforts by parents to formulate a child custody
arrangement. The new approach builds upon functions that the parents
performed when living together, but now the emphasis is upon bringing each
parent’s understanding of what works to the formulation of a mutually agreed
upon custody plan. Eventually this approach, incorporating function and joint
parental involvement, will be adopted by the American Law Institute either
through parenting plans,125 or if this is not possible, allocation of custodial
responsibility between the two parents.126 Under the ALI, the parents are offered
services to develop a parenting plan between themselves.127 But if they are
unable to, then a court may “allocate custodial responsibility so that the
proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent approximates the
121. See, e.g., Mary Kate Kearney, The New Paradigm in Custody Law: Looking at Parents
with a Loving Eye, 28 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 543, 561–62 (1996).
122. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 615, 617 (1992).
123. See David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 568 (1984).
124. Sanford N. Katz, “That They May Thrive” Goal of Child Custody: Reflections on the
Apparent Erosion of the Tender Years Presumption and the Emergence of the Primary Caretaker
Presumption, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 123, 132 (1992) (citing to Joseph Goldstein et
al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973)).
125. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.05.
126. See id. § 2.08.
127. Id. § 2.05 cmt. a–b. See infra Section II.D.
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proportion of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions for the
child prior to the parents’ separation.”128
Consistent with goals associated with the American Law Institute, an award
of custody based on allocation of custodial responsibility seeks to continue the
child’s relationship with both parents,129 but subject to the child’s reasonable
preferences, sibling integrity, and practicalities, such as economic and physical
constraints.130 The foremost rebuttal of the use of any allocation of custodial
responsibility occurs whenever such an allocation would result in “substantial
and almost certain harm to the child.”131
Rather than dismiss the primary caretaker custody arrangement, it should be
viewed as a step towards focusing on each parent’s “caretaking and other
parenting functions”132 that contributed to the “child’s best interest.”133 It
initiated a trend that would focus less on achieving fairness between the parents
and more on prioritizing the best interest of the child.134 Because it was thought
that a child would be better served by physical access to both parents,
legislatures and courts became more favorably disposed towards joint physical
custody arrangements.
C. Joint Physical Custody
Due in part to the evolving cultural parameters of gender, economic
opportunity, and personal liberty, interaction with both parents increasingly
appeared to be in the child’s best interest. Haltingly, to accommodate this, state
legislatures and courts rejected the approach of a winning and a losing parent,
focusing only on the attributes of each parent. Instead, rival groups advocating
for mothers and those advocating for fathers agreed each parent performing a
reasonable share of parenting functions were equally qualified. Absent domestic
violence or similar conflicting issues, courts began to focus on “shared custodial
responsibility and rights between parents, rather than legal neutrality as to which
[] individual parent gained total custody.”135 Focus was on parents sharing
childcare functions, not winning custody and allowing the other parent to visit.

128. Id. § 2.08(1).
129. Id. § 2.08(1)(a); see, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 48-9-206 (LexisNexis 2001).
130. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§§ 2.08(1)(b)–(1)(f); § 2.08(4).
131. Id. § 2.08(1)(h); see, e.g., E.O.R. v. M.D.W., No. 17-0355, 2018 W.Va. LEXIS 160, at
*10–12 (W. Va. 2018) (holding that allocation was warranted and appointing monitor to ensure
safety of the child).
132. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.05(2)(c).
133. See id. § 2.02(1) (including meaningful contact with both parents, certainty, and
predictable decision making).
134. Id. § 2.05(2).
135. Dinner, supra note 15, at 125.
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By the 1980s, joint physical custody became more of an option.136 Was this
to be a preference, a presumption, or was it to be reserved to those times when
the parents requested it? California became the first state to “incorporate a
presumption that joint custody served the best interests of the child when both
parents agreed to that arrangement.”137 Just as it had done with no-fault divorce
and enforceable nonmarital contracts involving intimacy, California’s adoption
of joint physical custody spearheaded greater discussion of the option across the
nation. “Within three years, every state had considered joint custody legislation,
and thirty had enacted statutes recognizing this custody arrangement. By 1989,
of the thirty-three states that had enacted statutes recognizing joint custody,
thirteen included ‘preferences’ or ‘rebuttable presumptions’ in favor of joint
custody.”138 Individual state statutes varied, but “generally limited the
presumption formally to instances of agreement between the parties, but also
included friendly parent provisions that in effect broadened that
presumption.”139
In an effort to promote the values associated with joint physical custody,
courts sought to craft joint custody arrangements, such as the following: One
parent has physical custody from Monday at 5:30 p.m. until Wednesday at 5:30
p.m.140 The other parent has parenting time from Wednesday at 5:30 p.m. until
Friday at 5:30 p.m. each week.141 In addition, the parents shall alternate
weekends, from Friday at 5:30 p.m. until Monday at 5:30 p.m. The parent
commencing the custody time is responsible for transportation throughout the
custody period.142 And finally, the parents will share the child during holidays
and summer vacations.143 Predictably, while meeting the goals encapsulated in
joint physical custody, the arrangement soon falters if the parents do not
communicate well or lack mutual respect.144
Viewed academically joint physical custody makes a great deal of sense.
Under normal circumstances a child thrives through equal access to both parents,
and state and federal constitutions forbid utilizing gender in all but the most
136. Joint physical custody is distinguished from joint legal custody in Blank v. Blank, 930
N.W.2d 523, 536 (Neb. 2019) (holding that “‘[j]oint legal custody’ is the mutual authority and
responsibility of the parents for making mutual fundamental decisions regarding the child’s
welfare, including choices regarding education and health.” (citation omitted)).
137. Dinner, supra note 15, at 133 (citing to Law of Sept. 22, 1979, ch. 915, § 1, 1979 Cal.
Stat. 3149, 3150 (amended 1983) (“There shall be a presumption, affecting the burden of proof,
that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child . . .”)).
138. Id. at 135 (citation omitted).
139. Id.
140. See In re Marriage of Luethje, No. 19-0768, 2020 Iowa App. Unpub. LEXIS 102, at *3
(Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2020).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 11–12; see also In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 698, 700 (Iowa 2007)
(holding that respect and communication issues prohibit use of joint physical custody).
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compelling circumstances. But at a practical level, even though women were
employed in the workforce, and men were able to perform all household chores,
the vast majority of families still adhered to traditional gender roles. Mother
remained primary caretakers of children and fathers remained the primary
breadwinner. Custody laws were ostensibly gender neutral, with an emphasis
on shared parenting functions, but in reality, the gender roles were not gender
neutral. This gender disparity has an impact on child support.
Men typically earn more from employment than women; mothers typically
perform more childrearing functions than fathers. Because a mother typically
was less invested in a paid career, typically had fewer financial resources, and
typically needed the child support payment to provide a home for her children,
any reduction in support had dire consequences. When divorce or physical
separation occurs the lower earning mother often has to support her single parent
household on her salary alone, usually with negligible or no decrease in the costs
associated with the physical presence of children. Divorce and the loss of a
second income “deepened the economic insecurity of poor mothers and
children.”145 Thus, while joint custody seemed fair and rationale, it in fact had
adverse impact on financial support for a parent with fewer economic resources.
Conceptually, the financial child support obligation is meant to equalize the
child’s joint parenting residential situation. When custody is awarded to the
residential parent and visitation to the other, the nonresident parent pays the
resident parent for the support of their child since the nonresident parent is not
expected to maintain an intact household for the child. But when there is a joint
custody arrangement, each parent is expected to maintain two separate
households to provide the child with equality of living arrangements. But when
there is joint custody, it seemingly negates child support from a nonresident to a
resident parent since each parent is separately providing a home for the child.
Ostensibly this seems fair, but in fact it is not if one of the parents has fewer
financial resources than the other. One commentator describes the resulting
unfairness:
By failing to account for the gendered division of labor within
marriage, fathers’ rights activism devalued women’s caregiving labor,
diminished mothers’ bargaining position at divorce, enabled men’s
continuing control over ex-spouses, and deepened economic
inequality between men and women at divorce. Indeed, most elements
of the [fathers’ rights] movement evolved in ensuing decades toward
extreme antifeminist and misogynist positions, often arguing that
women manipulated accusations of domestic violence and child abuse
to advance their custody and property interests at divorce.146

145. Dinner, supra note 15, at 139.
146. Id. at 146 (citing Kelly Allison Behre, Digging Beneath the Equality Language: The
Influence of the Fathers’ Rights Movement on Intimate Partner Violence Public Policy Debates
and Family Law Reform, 21 WM & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 525, 534–45 (2015)).
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One parent’s post-divorce financial insecurity may occur in three separate
ways. First, the compulsory state child support guideline will mandate that both
parents contribute to the financial support of their children. This is the start of
every child support calculation. Guidelines seek to provide the child with “a
minimum decent standard of living when the combined income of the parents is
sufficient to achieve such result without impoverishing either parent.”147 The
process expects the parent with more income to pay more support to the one with
less, so as to provide the child with “a standard of living not grossly inferior to
that of either parent.”148 But the guideline amounts may not be calculated to
take this into account, and even if they do, they may be rebutted if the rebuttal
would permit the “residential parents [to be] treated fairly.”149 That is, since
joint custody makes both parents residential parents, rebuttal fairness would
mean no support from one to the other.
Initially, “fairly” means less support for the lower income parent because it is
expected that his or her support duties are relatively equal to the other joint
parent. Ostensibly this seems justified and probably reasonable if the child
spends relatively equal time with each parent. But even if the child spends
substantially equal time with each of the parents, this calculation does not take
into consideration the fact that the lower income parent must provide a home for
the child, often with fewer economic resources. In reality, a child often “drifts”
towards one parent from the other and the corresponding costs rise with the
increasing presence of the child. Throughout, the parent with fewer economic
resources will not be able to provide a “minimum decent standard of living”150
for the child similar to the other parent without financial support. These facts
are often overlooked in the guidelines.
Second, parents who serve as primary caregivers during marriage often
reduced their investment in a career as a consequence. Therefore, these parents
“suffered a competitive disadvantage when divorce forced them to reenter the
labor market.”151 Because one parent, usually the mother, often sacrificed career
development to stay at home and raise the children, that parent is less able to
reenter the workforce and compete with the other parent who was able to develop
a career while his or her children were being raised at home. Income disparity
between the adults is compensated for in the division of marital property and/or
spousal support ordered by the court at divorce.152 Such apportionment is

147. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3.04(1)(a).
148. Id. § 3.04(1)(b).
149. Id. § 3.04(3).
150. Id. § 3.04(1)(a).
151. Dinner, supra note 15, at 142.
152. See, e.g., Rainwater v. Rainwater, 869 P.2d 176, 180–81 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that after a long term marriage and child care responsibilities, wife was entitled to an award of
rehabilitation and also financial support until death or remarriage to provide her with a standard of
living comparable to marriage).
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customary throughout the majority of states.153 But the child support guidelines
do not expressly provide for career compensation adequate enough to rectify the
disparity in reduced employment opportunities. Hence, the resulting need to
provide support to the parent who has made a sacrifice for the family to “provide
all family members with a minimum decent standard of living.”154
And third, the underlying premise of state statutory child support guidelines
is misleading.155 Specifically, the child support guidelines “apply the ‘intact
family’ child cost data to parental incomes and the number of children involved[]
and then add other factors, such as health care insurance premiums and child
care costs.”156 By using data applicable to one intact household as the premise
upon which to calculate the guidelines the result is misleading. There are in fact
two distinct intact households when parents no longer cohabit.157 As a result,
because there are two separate households, which must be separately
maintained, the guidelines do not take into consideration the reality of child
support. “Accordingly, current guidelines should be adjusted for the additional
cost of a second household to accurately reflect actual ability to pay[.]”158 The
lack of a proper premise upon which to calculate child support is explained as
follows:
Parents in divorced or unwed situations live in separate households
while intact families generally live in the same household. Thus, a
parent’s ability to pay is dramatically impacted if the parents are
unwed or divorced because the parents are paying two mortgages/rent
and two sets of household utilities. . . . Moreover, using economic data
for an intact household creates a fictional standard of living that
exceeds what is achievable by the parents for themselves. Therefore,
the view that a child is entitled to an intact family standard of living in
a divorced or unwed situation is inappropriate and unreasonable. It is
more appropriate and reasonable to base child support on a realistic
ability to pay that accurately reflects available income of parents living
in two separate households.159

153. See J. Thomas Oldham, An Overview of the Rules in the USA Regarding the Award of
Post-Divorce Spousal Support in 2019, 41 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 525, 527 (2019).
154. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3.04 cmt. (c)(i).
155. R. Mark Rogers & David A. Standridge, Child Support Cost Tables: The Case for Second
Household Adjustment, 49 N. M. L. REV. 256 (2019).
156. Id.
157. The American Law Institute acknowledges this in its recitation of child support
objectives. “Normally, the preparation standard of living of all family members cannot be
maintained at dissolution, for the cost of maintaining two household at a given standard of living
is substantially greater than that of maintaining one.” PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.04, cmt. (c).
158. Rogers & Standridge, supra note 156, at 257.
159. Id. at 258.
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Not surprisingly, the federalization of child support through mandated
guidelines and enforcement has focused states’ attention on meeting federal
standards, often neglecting the reality of what is socially occurring.160
Nonetheless, an amount established under the state guidelines is presumptively
correct, only rebuttable if there is one or more factors that would make the
amount established by the guidelines extraordinarily unjust.161 And while it may
be possible to argue that joint physical custody and the establishment of two
separate households is a sufficient rebutting factor, such a process is expensive,
time consuming, and often beyond the understanding of the parties involved. At
a minimum, state child support guidelines must specifically accommodate the
fact of joint physical custody—and the added financial consequences borne by
a parent with financial disparity.162 But this is inadequate too. Child support is
important, and the inequities brought about because of the increased use of joint
custody demand a process similar to what is provided to parents in formulating
parenting plans. Specifically, parents should be offered court-ordered services
to prepare child support orders.163 When proposing parenting plans as a custody
arrangement, the American Law Institute stipulated that parents must have
access to information, mediation, and informed consent when developing a plan
by which they would share child custody. The parenting plan process
recommended by the ALI is worthy of consideration when addressing disparity
of child support.
D. Parenting Plans
Each custody arrangement discussed previously incorporates what was then
thought to be in the best interest of the child. Hence, best interest is not a standalone custody arrangement, rather it is the goal and substance of each and every
child custody arrangement. Sole custody in the father or mother, an award to a
primary caretaker, or joint physical custody between two equal parents was each
considered, at a point in time, to be in the best interest of the child. This
assimilation is illustrated in a Nebraska Supreme Court decision, holding that
“Nebraska law neither favors nor disfavors any particular custody arrangement
160. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–485, § 103(a)(3), 102 Stat. 2343 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2)) (illustrating the federal mandated rebuttable presumption in state child
support guidelines).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., State v. Jeffrey T., 932 N.W.2d 692, 713 (Neb. 2019) (citing to Neb. Ct. R. § 4212 (rev. 2011)):
When a specific provision for joint physical custody is ordered and each party’s parenting
time exceeds 142 days per year, it is a rebuttable presumption that support shall be
calculated using worksheet 3. When a specific provision for joint physical custody is
ordered and one party’s parenting time is 109 to 142 days per year, the use of worksheet
3 to calculate support is at the discretion of the court. . . . For purposes of these guidelines,
a “day” shall be generally defined as including an overnight period.
163. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.07.
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and instead requires all such determinations to be based on the best interests of
the child.”164 Clearly the substance is best interest, the form is mutable.
In addition to evolving custody arrangements, legislators and courts now seek
to avoid a winning and a losing parent. They avoid determination language that
awards the child to one or the other parent as if the child were a prize awarded
at the end of a conflict. In times past, judges were “called upon to evaluate the
child’s life chances in each of the homes competing for custody and then to
predict with whom the child will be better off in the future.”165 Today, as is
illustrated in an Iowa decision, there is a preference for “joint decisionmaking
on routine matters” between both parents.166 This shift in attitude is true even
when parents are contentious and having difficulty communicating.167
As a result, parents are increasingly encouraged to develop workable
“parenting plans” that focus on the child’s needs after parents cease
cohabiting.168 The plans are expected to incorporate criteria for resolving future
disputes between the parents, careful to use litigation as the last resort, and
maximizing each parent’s continuing participation in the child’s life.169 To assist
parents in formulating these plans, courts may provide parents with information,
services to address conflicts such as domestic violence, and mediation services
to assist in arriving at an agreement.170 Parenting plans have changed the way
that custody is addressed in state courtrooms. One commentator observes “the
vocabulary of child custody law has changed to emphasize ‘shared parenting,’
‘decision-making,’ and ‘parenting plans’ in place of the more rigid and
possessory terms, such as ‘custody’ and ‘visitation,’ which sound like refugees
from criminal punishment.”171
The American Law Institute (ALI) provides a comprehensive approach to
using parenting plans, and its approach has been adopted by a majority of
individual states.172 First beginning with the definition, the ALI defines a
parenting plan as a set of provisions for allocation of custodial responsibility and
decision-making responsibility on behalf of a child and for the resolution of
164. Jeffrey T., 932 N.W.2d at 697.
165. Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders, 381 A.2d 1154, 1163 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1977).
166. In re Marriage of Hynick, 727 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Iowa 2007).
167. See, e.g., Pace v. Pace, 595 S.W.3d 347, 352–53 (Ark. 2020).
168. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.05.
169. See id. § I2 II; see also id. § 2.10 (detailing a process for dispute resolution unless
otherwise specified in parenting plan).
170. Id. § 2.07(1). Costs associated with these services should be reasonable or at no cost at
all. Id. § 2.07(6).
171. J. Herbie DiFonzo, Dilemmas of Shared Parenting in the 21st Century: How Law and
Culture Shape Child Custody, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1003, 1009 (2015).
172. For an example of a parenting plan see Sayre v. Furgeson, 66 N.E.3d 332, 335 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2016); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1705 (2006); see also Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.102
(2017).
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future disputes between the parents.173 The goal, as with other arrangements, is
to maximize the child’s best interest by assisting parents to formulate a plan for
the future. Allocation of custodial responsibility is more than what was
envisioned in the primary caretaker arrangement discussed above.174 Rather, the
ALI proposal draws upon past conduct, but also anticipates future conduct:
including “(a) parental planning and agreement about the child’s custodial
arrangements and upbringing; (b) continuity of existing parent-child
attachments; (c) meaningful contact between the child and each parent; (d)
caretaking relationships by adults who love the child, know how to provide for
the child’s needs, and place a high priority on doing so; (e) security from
exposure to conflict and violence; [and] (f) expeditious, predictable decisionmaking and the avoidance of prolonged uncertainty respecting arrangements for
the child’s care and control.”175
The process contemplated by the ALI begins whenever parents cease to
cohabit, usually occasioned by a petition for divorce or legal separation. Of
course nonmarital cohabitants are parents and may formulate parenting plans
too.176 The parent or parents seeking child custody must then, in states requiring
them, file with the court a parenting plan, accompanied by an affidavit
describing, among other items, past parenting responsibilities for the child,
employment obligations, child care possibilities, and any expected changes to
these items in the future.177 Importantly, if there are allegations or reports of
parental conflict, domestic violence, or child abuse, these issues should be made
known.178 If there is credible evidence that conflict or abuse exists in the
household then mediation to arrive at a plan should not occur unless both parents
agree to participate in a meaningful way.179
What separates formulation of a parenting plan from computation of child
support is that with the latter, there are no direct court-ordered services that assist
173. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.03 cmt. d.
174. See supra Section II.B.
175. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.02(1). Fairness between the parents is a secondary objective. Id. § 2.02(2); but see id. § 3.04
cmt. (c)(i) (“Contemplated child-support rules must be rigorously examined in terms of the equity
and adequacy of outcomes.”).
176. See O’Brien, Marital Versus Nonmarital Entitlements, supra note 27, at 113.
177. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.05(2). States may offer assistance to parents needing it in developing a parenting plan. See id.
§ 2.07.
178. Id. § 2.05(2)–(3) ; see also §§ 2.06(2), 2.07(1)(c), 2.07(2)–(3) (permitting the court to hold
an evidentiary hearing to determine if child abuse or domestic violence has occurred). “Currently,
all fifty states and the District of Columbia require courts making a custody determination to
consider domestic violence by one parent against another.” J. Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of
One to Shared Parenting: Custody Presumptions in Law in Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 224
(2014).
179. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.07(2).
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parents to understand and formulate a comprehensive child support order. The
state is more heavily invested in a child custody arrangement, so it assists parents
in developing an adequate parenting plan. Once the plan is formulated and filed
with the court, it may serve as a temporary or a final plan180 based on what
appears to be in the child’s best interest.181 And, throughout its viability, the
plan may be enforced through provisions in the plan itself, civil remedies, or
criminal prosecution.182
At a minimum any acceptable parenting plan submitted to the court for
approval should include the following: (1) a description of the child’s living
arrangements at each parent’s home, and (2) the schedule/formula of when that
child will reside at each home. This is referred to as the custodial schedule. The
parenting plan must also include a process by which significant child care
decisions may be made, and a plan for resolving disputes that may arise and
recourse for violations of the plan’s terms.183 The process for future
modification of any plan approved by the court may be specified in the plan
too.184 Interestingly, parenting plans are meant to be inclusive of all types of
families, any number of living arrangements, multiple custodial persons, and
scheduling designed by the parents themselves. There are some limitations.
Those persons defined as parents enjoy Constitutional Due Process protections
that empower them to withdraw visitation or custody arrangements from
nonparents.185
Once the parenting plan is properly submitted the court is bound to give the
agreement “deference” unless the agreement “(a)is not knowing or voluntary, or
(b) would be harmful to the child.”186 And while allegations of domestic
violence or child abuse are easily alleged and serious, it is the parents’
unwillingness to cooperate in drafting another mediation-assisted agreement that
180. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wilson, 68 P.3d 1121, 1127 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (holding
that a parenting plan becomes a permanent one whenever the court so specifies).
181. See Bessette v. Bessette, 434 P.3d 894, 270–71 (Mont. 2019) (distinguishing among
stipulated, temporary and final parenting plans); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.05(4) (providing for temporary allocation
of parenting).
182. See id. § 2.19.
183. Id. § 2.05(5). Mediation is one method of resolving disputes. See id. § 2.07.
184. Id. §§ 2.05(6), 2.15–2.16 (granting courts power to modify upon material change in
circumstances or if the plan is not working as contemplated); see, e.g., Sinram v. Berube, 432 P.3d
709, 712–13 (Mont. 2019) (utilizing provision in plan permitting modification thereby avoiding a
petition for court-ordered modification); Todd M.S. v. Julie M.G., 741 S.E.2d 837, 843–44 (W. Va.
2013) (holding that modification based on terms of the parenting plan does not require substantial
change of circumstances).
185. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.03 cmt. a–b (defining legal parents, parents by estoppel, and de facto parents).
186. Id. § 2.06(1); see also § 2.111 (listing factors that rebut the approval of a parenting plan);
see, e.g., Thorton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. 2019) (domestic abuse rebuts any deference
for the parental agreement); Araya v. Keleta, 65 A.3d 40, 44 (D.C. 2013) (an “intrafamily offense”
is a rebuttable factor).
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will rebut the deference attaching to the parenting plan.187 Overall, public policy
concludes that a properly executed parenting plan “is more likely to succeed than
one that has been ordered by the court over the objection of one or both
parents.”188 Thus, the goal is to provide the parents with services that will
produce a constructive plan of custody. A similar commitment for child support
is warranted.
But what if parents cannot work together to formulate an effective parenting
plan? Stated another way, what if the presumption in favor of a parenting plan
is rebutted by the inescapable fact that the parents cannot cooperate, or that the
presence of violence or abuse cannot be mitigated? The ALI then offers an
alternative. A court may “allocate custodial responsibility so that the proportion
of custodial time the child spends with each parent approximates the proportion
of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions for the child prior to
the parents’ separation.”189 Even though a court is imposing a custody
arrangement upon the parents, the objectives it utilizes are similar to those meant
to be incorporated into a parenting plan drafted by the child’s parents. Also, by
mimicking the past custodial responsibilities a court is utilizing what the parents
have done in the past, thereby involving the parents more directly in any custody
arrangement. And finally, “reliance on past caretaking . . . [corresponds]
reasonably well to the parties’ actual expectations” not clouded by anger, loss
and anxiety often associated with divorce.190
Allocation of custodial responsibility by a court rather than through a
parenting plan still seeks the following objectives in uniformity throughout the
state: (1) to permit the child a reasonable relationship with each parent; (2) to
accommodate a child’s preferences if the child is of a reasonable age; (3) to keep
siblings together if it appears this would further the welfare of a child; (4) to
accommodate a child’s individual welfare and one parent’s unique ability to
meet the child’s needs; (5) to accommodate any established parenting
arrangement if it is reasonable and serves the child’s interests; and (6) to
emphasize the practical circumstances that involve the child’s stability,
including scheduling, transportation, costs, and parental cooperation.191 And, as
with any child custody order, should there be a material change of
circumstances, such as a relocation of a custodial parent or a danger of harm to
a child, the custody allocation may be modified.192 If there is insufficient

187. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.06(3).
188. Id. § 2.06 cmt. a.
189. Id. § 2.08(1).
190. Id. § 2.08 cmt. b.
191. Id. § 2.08(1)(a)–(f). Courts often find sibling integrity in the best interest of a child. See,
e.g., In re Marriage of Will, 489 N.W.2d 394, 398 (Iowa 1992).
192. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.08(1)(g)–(h) (specifying relocation in accordance with § 2.17(4) and accommodating “substantial
and almost certain harm to the child”).
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evidence to establish a pattern of past custodial responsibility, then the court
should make an award based on the child’s best interest and the practical
circumstances involved.193
The American Law Institute distinguishes a child’s physical custody from his
or her legal custody, which is a common distinction among the states. The ALI
refers to legal custody as significant decision-making responsibilityand this
includes the “mutual authority and responsibility . . . for making mutual
fundamental decisions regarding the child’s welfare, including choices
regarding education and health.”194 Although different from physical custody,
when awarding legal custody the ALI first looks to any agreement between the
parties. Indeed, even if there is no express agreement, if there has developed a
pattern of decision-making responsibility then presumptively this pattern is to
be adopted unless contrary to the best interest of the child.195
If there is no mutual agreement, or no existing pattern of decision making,
then decision making responsibility is allocated by the court based on what is in
the best interest of the child.196 And throughout physical and legal custody the
American Law Institute promotes each parent’s involvement with the child.
This is illustrated by permitting a parent without joint decision making authority
nonetheless to possess “sole responsibility for day-to-day decisions” whenever
the child is in that parent’s physical control.197 That parent also has access to
school and health care records unless such access would not be in the best
interest of the child.198
Enforcement of the parenting plan begins with a complaint from a parent
alleging that another parent “intentionally and without good cause violated a
provision.”199 The court will then enforce the plan by first looking to whether
there is an enforcement mechanism built into the plan. If not, the court will
apply other remedies, such as make-up visitation time, reasonable expenses
associated with the infraction, order that the offending parent undergo
counseling, or modify the plan.200 Enforcement through civil contempt is also a
remedy.201 But enforcement mechanisms do not include permitting parents to
commit offenses in retaliation for the other parent’s violation. And finally,
193. Id. § 2.08(3)–(4).
194. Blank v. Blank, 930 N.W.2d 523, 536 (Neb. 2019) (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-2922(11)
(2016)).
195. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.09(2).
196. Id. § 2.09(1). State courts will look to the allocation of physical custody, the level of each
parent’s decision making in the past, the wishes of the parent, level of cooperation between the
parents in the past, and the existences of limiting factors such as abuse, violence, neglect, or parental
alienation. See id. § 2.11(1).
197. Id. § 2.09(3).
198. Id. § 2.09(4).
199. Id. § 2.19(1).
200. Id. § 2.19(1)(a)–(f).
201. See, e.g., In re Custody of Halls, 109 P.3d 15, 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
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parents may depart from the terms of the plan if they mutually agree and the
departures is consistent with the terms of their plan agreement.202
Many states utilize ALI parenting plans when addressing child custody, either
expressly or implicitly, by requiring, as a condition for joint custody, that the
parents communicated with each other and demonstrate respect.203 But because
joint custody is involved in either arrangement there is the possibility that the
parent with fewer financial resources may suffer unjustly. To illustrate, a
Minnesota court awarded joint physical custody of the children to the parents
upon their divorce.204 The mother received 57% of parenting time and the father
received 43%, well within the parameters of what would constitute joint physical
custody205. Then, because the parents purportedly had relatively equal amount
of time with the children, they agreed to deviate from the state sanctioned child
support guidelines and instead to use an expense-sharing formula.206 This
agreement resulted in no child support being paid to the parent with the lesser
income even though the proportion of that parent’s income would be adversely
affected by the significant physical presence of the child.207 But for the parent
with greater income, the income proportion needed to care for the child would
be less, plus there is no payment of child support to the other parent. Obviously,
a joint custody plan can be advantageous to this parent, the parent with greater
financial resources.
There is a financial incentive for the higher income parent to petition for joint
physical custody because, if granted, it will likely result in reduced or no child
support payments. And even if joint custody is not granted, the threat of it may
incentivize the lower income parent to surrender child support, spousal support
or division of marital property so as to retain as much physical custody of the
child as possible. As one commentator writes, “the parent more invested in
custody will often trade away marital property, spousal support, or child support
for a greater share of custody. Some claim that the less-invested parent may
threaten to initiate custody litigation to pressure the other parent to make such
tradeoffs.”208
202. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.19(2)–(3).
203. See, e.g.,, Klimek v. Klimek, 775 N.W.2d 444, 450 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that
“communication is an essential requirement for joint custody to be successful”).
204. Pudlick v. Pudlick, No. A18-1652, 2019 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1031, at *1–2 (Ct.
App. Nov. 4, 2019).
205. Id. at *2.
206. Id.
207. See id. at *1–2, *9–10.
208. Abramowicz & Abramowicz, supra note 56, at 391–92 (citations omitted); see also
Elizabeth S. Scott, supra note 122, 651–52; Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule:
Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 168, 178–79 (1984)
(denigrating trading custody for money); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 963–65 (1979) (discussing the
disadvantages encountered by a parent seeking more custody of a child).

2021]

Child Support and Joint Physical Custody

261

Child support is impacted by joint physical custody, often to the detriment of
a parent with fewer economic resources yet willing to trade financial support or
marital property for maximum amounts of child custody. Yet while courts often
provide extensive services to couples drafting parenting plans, such services are
absent when couples negotiate child support arrangements. These arrangements,
left to attorneys to negotiate the states’ mathematical guidelines, are suffused
with allegations of domestic violence, parental alienation, and fictitious schemes
of joint parenting times. Child support determinations deserve the same courtordered services as are offered for child custody. But first we need to review
how child support is calculated.
III. CHILD SUPPORT
A. Purposes
If the best interest of the child is the focus of child custody, then it follows
that the goal of child support should be to enhance any custody arrangement.
And yet, the calculation of child support has not kept pace with the evolution of
child custody. Joint physical custody is often overlooked in guideline
formulations or accommodated in a facile manner. For example, Nebraska child
support guidelines specify “that when [] visitation or parenting time periods of
28 days or more in any 90-day period, support payments may be reduced by up
to 80 percent . . . using the trial court’s discretion.”209 Thus, if a child support
paying parent has physical custody of his or her child for the entire summer,
three months, that parent’s child support payment should be supplemented by
fifty percent to accommodate for the added costs associated with the physically
present child.210 And yet, this supplement is not certain, it is discretionary as a
rebuttable factor, contrasted with the knowledge that the other parent must still
maintain the child’s other home for that child’s eventual return.211
The fault lies in the computation of a state’s statutory guideline, which is
static, and not always rectified by rebuttable factors.212 The guideline is
mandatory as the starting point and a court must find, and reduce to writing, its
rebutting determination that the percentage of time each parent will have
physical custody will not accurately reflect the ratio of funds each parent will

209. Lucero v. Lucero, 750 N.W.2d 377, 383–85 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that trial courts
must use specific guideline worksheets accommodating different custody periods).
210. Id. at 389.
211. See, e.g., Frost v. Monahan, No. A-18-1081, 2020 Neb. App. LEXIS 107, at *23–24 (Ct.
App. Apr. 7, 2020) (holding that physical custody of the child did not warrant an abatement of child
support).
212. See, e.g., Serrano v. Serrano, No. 2018-CA-001888-ME, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS
178, at *10–11 (Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2020) (noting that state legislation has not provided for a
statutory support calculation for joint custody).
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directly spend on supporting the child.213 Thus, the child support guideline is
the rebuttable support amount each parent must pay. Any rebuttal must be
supported with written findings as to why the application of the guideline
amount would be unjust or improper.214 This of course generates bargaining
between the parties, but this bargaining is not comparable to that which goes into
drafting a parenting plan.215 State-ordered services offered to the parents are not
mandated and often parents—and their attorneys—are perplexed by the
mathematical basis of the guidelines. The state’s child support guidelines should
serve as a baseline upon which the couple may build a workable support
framework that focuses on the best interest of the child, similar to child custody.
This is not a novel suggestion: “We see the primary function of contemporary
divorce law not as imposing order from above, but rather as providing a
framework within which divorcing couples can themselves determine their post
dissolution rights and responsibilities.”216
An illustration of guidelines deficiency, the inefficiency of rebutting the
guideline amount, and the unfairness that results occurred in a decision from the
Kentucky Court of Appeals.217 The facts include a couple married for seven
years and two children were born during this time.218 When they separated, the
parents formulated a joint custody arrangement that coordinated work schedules
and minimized the need for formal daycare.219 Under the state’s guideline
calculation the father was obligated to pay $722 in child support because he
earned more than the mother, but without a written finding, the court reduced
this to $67 a month.220 It appears that the trial court deviated—rebutted—the
state guideline amount because the couple had agreed to a joint custody
arrangement and the guideline did not incorporate an allowance for joint
custody.
The state trial court’s deviation was understandable but its rebuttal and failure
to issue written findings prompted the other to appeal its ruling and thus claim
the higher amount of $722 monthly. The state’s appellate court identified the
issue as a legislative failure to incorporate joint custody into the state’s child
213. See Vogus v. Vogus, 460 P.3d 1220, 1223–24, 1223 n.11 (Alaska 2020) (citing Alaska R.
Civ. Proc. 90.3(b)).
214. See Griggs v. Griggs, 304 So. 741, 746 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (citing Rule 32(A), Ala. R.
Jud. Admin.).
215. See Brinig, supra note 16, at 811–12 (suggesting that “bargaining occurs despite the
apparent rigidity and statewide applicability of child support guidelines”).
216. Mnookin & Kornhouser, supra note 208, at 950.
217. Serrano v. Serrano, No. 2018-CA-001888-ME, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 178, at
*26–28 (Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2020).
218. Id. at *1.
219. Id.
220. Id. at *27; see also Carver v. Carver, 488 S.W.3d 585, 593 (Ky. 2016) (noting a court
must file a specific finding for deviation from the guideline amount); see also Fam. Support Act of
1988, 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (2018) (requiring a written or specific finding to rebut the guidelines
presumption).
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support guidelines.221 Since 2018, Kentucky joined with other states in finding
that joint custody is in the best interest of the child,222 but “[t]o whatever degree
the legislature has kept pace with society when it comes to custody itself, it lags
much further behind when it comes to the child support statutes.”223 Indeed,
“the legislature has yet to devise a statutory support calculation for what has
become a far more common custody arrangement—joint custody and equal
parenting time.”224 The appellate court also stated, “[m]aking either joint
custodian with equal parenting time pay his or her support obligation to the other
is obviously unjust and, frankly, antithetical to the custody award.”225 Thus, to
achieve fairness, “the judiciary is left to decide [child] support by creatively
applying existing statutes and the existing sole custody worksheet to
circumstances for which they are not designed.”226
The judiciary may rebut the guideline financial award with a finding that the
amount is extraordinarily unjust or inappropriate. Kentucky confines the
meaning of this phrase to seven criteria enumerated in statute,227 but meeting the
extraordinary level is difficult. For example, the Kentucky appellate court in
Serrano held that an award of joint custody with equal parenting time is not a
sufficient extraordinary factor so as to effectively rebut the presumption
provided by the guideline.228 This merits a brief discussion of the guidelines.
B. Function
The establishment and enforcement of child support obligations through state
and federal statutes is recent but unyielding. Courts have “repeatedly
recognized, one of the most fundamental duties of parenthood is ‘the obligation
of the parent to support the child until the law determines that he is able to care
for himself.’”229 And yet the level of that parental support was vague,
encompassing necessities at first and then focusing on the child’s needs and the
parent’s ability to pay. In our discussion of the evolution of custody
arrangements in the beginning there was one residential parent and one
221. Serrano v. Serrano, No. 2018-CA-001888-ME, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 178, at *3
(Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2020).
222. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2) (West 2018).
223. Serrano, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 178, at *13.
224. Id. at 17. The court suggested that courts begin to use another form of guideline, one
which will allow for joint custody and two separate households. Id. at 33, 36–37. See id. at 33–37
(identifying the Colorado Method of calculating child support as one such method and
recommending the lower court use it).
225. Id. at 26–27.
226. Id. at 18; see also Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759, 765 (Ky. 2008) (holding that
standardization is difficult when statutes do not address all of the possible permeations).
227. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.211(3)–(4) (West 2018).
228. Serrano, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 178, at *31–32. But holding that the trial court
may find that the cost of providing two homes is extraordinary. Id.
229. Monmouth Cty. Div. of Soc. Servs. for D.M. v. G.D.M., 705 A.2d 408, 410 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (quoting Wills v. Jones, 667 A.2d 331, 332 (Md. 1995).
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nonresidential parent, the nonresidential parent was expected to pay for
whatever the residential parent needed to provide for the child’s needs. Even
then, child support awards were spotty, variable, and lacked interstate
enforceability. “Research at the state level . . . documented considerable
variation in award values, even among families of similar size and
socioeconomic characteristics.”230 Inconsistency in awards fostered both lack
of payment and lack of enforcement.
Nonetheless, child support became increasingly important after California
became the first state to permit no-fault divorce in 1969. Previously divorce
could only be brought by an innocent spouse who could show a provable fault
by the other spouse, such as adultery, desertion, or cruelty. After 1969, divorce
could be obtained by either spouse, innocent or guilty, simply by showing the
couple experienced irreconcilable differences, which led to the irremediable
breakdown of the marriage.231 Other states quickly joined California and
enacted similar no-fault statutes and divorce rates soared,232 which accelerated
the child support determinations. By 1970, the National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws voted to make “irretrievable breakdown”
the sole ground for divorce, which was defined as parties living separate and
apart for more than 180 days.233
In 1973, the National Conference enacted codified provisions for awarding
child support in its Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, one of the first efforts
to codify family law standards. The Act provided highly discretionary factors
for a court to consider when ordering a parent, without regard to marital fault, to
pay an amount “reasonable or necessary” for a child’s support.234 The court was
to consider the following factors:
(1) the financial resources of the child; (2) the financial resources of
the custodial parent; (3) the standard of living the child would have
enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved; (4) the physical and
emotional condition of the child and his educational needs; and (5) the
financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.235
Interpretations of these factors were subjective, and results lacked
consistency.
Gradually there developed an increasing number of children in single-parent
households that were defined by state standards as below the poverty line.
Concomitantly, these identified children were more likely to experience poor
health issues, behavioral problems, higher school dropout rates, incarceration,
230. Marsha Garrison, Autonomy of Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental
Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41, 43 (1998).
231. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310(a) (2015).
232. See Raymond C. O’Brien, The Reawakening of Marriage, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 339, 354
(1999) (noting divorce rate doubled between 1960 and 1990).
233. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 302 cmt. (a)(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973).
234. Id. § 309.
235. Id.
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and early childbearing and divorce rates. While not confined to poor homes,
there were multiple instances of child abuse, neglect, abandonment, and
surrender, resulting in foster care placements for children. Foster care placement
was expensive and by 1980 “more than 500,000 children resided in foster care
while child-protective agencies worked with families by providing services and
an open time frame for modification of adverse behavior.”236
Ultimately, the Federal government paid for foster care but to curb
expenditures Congress enacted a series of legislation that, in effect, federalized
child support in each of the states. First, Congress passed the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) in 1980, which mandated that
states meet definitive standards or otherwise federal foster care payments would
cease.237 Among these specified standards are: (1) a written case plan for each
child; (2) a description of where the child is placed and the reasonable services
offered to the parents to facilitate family reunification; (3) as an alternative,
services provided to establish another permanent placement for the child; (4) an
administrative review of the child’s placement at least every six months; and (5)
a judicial review no later than eighteen months after the initial placement and
periodically thereafter.238 States were forced to comply with the federal
mandates and as a result “within five years of its passage, the AACWA reduced
the number of children in foster care to 270,000.”239 Yet, numbers of children
in foster care began to rise again.240
Following its 1980 legislation, Congress enacted a statute in 1997 that focused
less on reasonable services offered to parents and more on finding reasonable
placements for children as quickly as possible.241 The focus shifted from parents
to children. Freeing children from interminable foster care benefitted federal
coffers, but it was a significant shift in policy.242 The Adoption and Safe
Families Act (ASFA)243 was enacted in 1997 and had as its stated goal to
“achieve permanency for children at an accelerated pace.”244 Specifically, the
236. Raymond C. O’Brien, Reasonable Efforts and Parent-Child Reunification, 2013 MICH.
STATE L. REV. 1029, 1042 (2013).
237. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 471 (b), 94
Stat. 500 (1980). But see generally Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens: How
Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 233 (2014) (discussing child support
and its interaction with child welfare); Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U.
KAN. L. REV. 229 (2000).
238. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 § 475(5)(B)–(C).
239. O’Brien, Reasonable Efforts and Parent-Child Reunification, supra note 236, at 1042.
240. Id. at 1042–43.
241. Id. at 1043.
242. See generally Kathleen S. Bean, Aggravated Circumstances, Reasonable Efforts, and
ASFA, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 223 (2009) (noting the significant change in policy as focus
shifted from the parents to the children).
243. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105–89, § 1(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)
[hereinafter ASFA]; 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii) (2012).
244. O’Brien, Reasonable Efforts and Parent-Child Reunification, supra note 236, at 1043.

266

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 70.2:1

1997 legislation requires the state to petition a court for termination of parental
rights if a child resides in foster care for more than fifteen of the last twenty-two
months.245
A year earlier, Congress replaced the open-ended welfare benefits provided
by Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with time-limited benefits
coupled with strict work requirements. This legislation was titled the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). It was part of broader legislation titled
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA).246 The legislation had a profound impact on state child support
because it offers federal grants to the states but requires states to comply with
federal mandates in return.247 Specifically, PRWORA requires that states submit
plans on how each will implement family assistance programs, including a plan
on how the state will require a parent to engage in employment as soon as
possible, but no later than twenty-four months.248 In addition, the state must
certify that it will implement a child support enforcement program,249 which
includes federal and state measures: a Federal Parent Locator Service. States
are required to have a State Directory of New Hires; a separate organization to
“provide services relating to the establishment of paternity or the establishment,
modification, or enforcement of child support obligations;” a state disbursement
unit to collect and disburse support payments; and a statewide information
system, including a case registry system to track the collection of child
support and a system to “facilitate the collection and disbursement of support
payments.”250
In 1984, Congress required states to adopt nonbinding formulaic child support
guidelines. Then, in 1988, federal legislation required that these guidelines be
given presumptive effect and any rebuttal requires a written justification.251 The
American Law Institute comments that “the factors that underlay inadequate or
unjust discretionary child-support awards could not be expected to vanish in the
face of formulaic guidelines; those factors might instead be expected to
influence rulemakers who construct the guidelines.”252 Developments such as
joint custody are expected to be addressed by those responsible for formulating
the guidelines themselves.
Each state is able to formulate a child support guideline that seems most
appropriate to any set of circumstances as long as it take into consideration
245. ASFA § 103(a)(3)(E).
246. H.R. Rep. No. 104-651 (1997), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183.
247. See, e.g., Hodges v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that if a state
fails to comply with federal requirements it must pay a penalty).
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii).
249. See id. § 602(a)(2).
250. See id. §§ 653(a)(1), 653a(a)(1)(A), 654(4)(A), 654a(b), 654a(e)(4)(A)–(B), 654a(g)(1).
251. See id. § 667(b)(2).
252. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ I4.
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certain minimal requirements and a process of review at least every four years.253
States have enacted three different types of guidelines: (1) Melson Formula, (2)
Percentage of Income, and (3) Income Shares Model.254 A majority of states use
the income shares model, in part because it begins with the premise that a child
should be provided with support from both parents as if the parents had never
separated.255
Once a state adopts a guideline formula it then must determine income, gross
and net, future modification parameters, plus at what point should support
end.256 And, of course, what constitutes sufficient grounds for rebuttal of the
guideline amount.257 There are those who criticize using intact family spending
data to create a guideline amount when in fact two separate households exist.258
But any guideline is presumptive and maybe rebutted by such factors
incorporated into the guideline such as joint custody, medical necessities, and
childcare, or insurance. Otherwise, objections to the guidelines may occur
through rebuttal, but even here there are limits. Rebuttal must be based on
written findings making the award unjust, such as added expenses such as
childcare.259
Ordering child support should not be equated with receipt of child support.
Consistently, less than half of parents obligated to receive child support actually
receive the full amount due, and the other half receive partial payment or nothing
at all.260 Nonetheless, federal efforts to collect unpaid child support have
aggressively expanded since the Child Support and Establishment of Paternity
amendments of 1974 and 1975, whereby states were directed to locate parents

253. See 45 C.F.R. § 302.56 (2019).
254. See Child Support Guideline Models by Model Type, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES
(July 10, 2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/guideline-models-by-state.aspx; see
also Laura W. Morgan, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION (2018)
(comparing types of child support guidelines).
255. See Voishan v. Palma, 609 A.2d 319, 321–22 (Md. 1992) (detailing the computations of
support by means of the income shares model); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.19 (2016)
(providing example statutory income shares payment schedule).
256. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-115(3)(c) (West 2018) (defining income); VT.
STAT. ANN. TIT., 15 § 656a(b) (West 2018) (adjustments for additional dependents); PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.14 (defining a
parent’s income for the purpose of establishing a child support award); Id. §§ 3.17–3.23 (review
and modification of child support); Id. § 3.24 (duration of the child support obligation); Ricci v.
Ricci, 154 A.3d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2017) (adulthood ends the obligation for support).
257. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-115(8)(e) (“here its application would be
inequitable, unjust, or inappropriate”); Permitting rebuttal for specified reasons or “even if a factor
enumerated in this section does not exist.” Id.
258. See, e.g., R. Mark Rogers and David A. Standridge, supra note 156, 257; Ira Mark Ellman
& Tara O’Toole Ellman, The Theory of Child Support, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 107, 117–20 (2008).
259. See Griggs v. Griggs, 304 So. 3d 741 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020).
260. Timothy S. Grall, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, P60-263,
CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2015, 12 (2020),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018/demo/P60-262.pdf.
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and establish paternity.261 For example, in 1988 Congress enacted the Family
Support Act,262 which required wage withholding, automatic tracking and
monitoring systems, and the Act also created a special Commission on Interstate
Child Support Enforcement. Then, in 1990, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act required the Internal Revenue Service to collect child support arrearages of
$500 or more when required by the state.263
Once federal enforcement of child support collection showed progress,
additional legislation followed. In 1992, the Child Support Recovery Act made
it a federal crime to withhold interstate child support,264 and in 1994, the Full
Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act required each state to enforce the
child support orders of other states and prohibited modification of them without
proper jurisdiction.265 By 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),266 which required each
state to enact the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act,267 codifying
procedures for establishing jurisdiction for initiating or modifying any support
order. Overall, federal enforcement included refusal to issue a passport,268
permitting states to employ civil incarceration for refusal to pay child support,269
and enactment of the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998.270
Undoubtedly the federalization of child support has forced states to develop
consistent state-wide support orders, it has forced states to better identify parents
and collect child support from each, and in this mobile society it has made
collection available across state lines. There is some federal involvement in
child custody, but federal involvement is not nearly as prevalent as with child

261. 42 U.S.C. § 651 (2016). A separate unit at the Department of Health and Human Services
was directed to monitor state performance and help states perform their duties. See § 653(h)(1)–
(2). In addition, sovereign immunity was waived. Id. § 659(a). Suits may be brought in federal
courts. Id. § 652(a)(8). States could forward uncollected support award to the Secretary of the
Treasury for collection. Id. § 652(b).
262. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-485, §§ 101(a)(3)(A), 123, 126(a).
263. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 664(b)(2)(A), 666(b) (2012).
264. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2012).
265. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(a) (2006).
266. Pub. L. No. 116-193, §§ 652–666 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 652–666 (2012)).
267. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 321, 110 Stat. 2221
(1996).
268. See, e.g., Eunique v. Powell, 302 F.3d 971, 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that denial
of a passport is within the control of Congress); see Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
269. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers 564 U.S. 431, 435, 444 (2011) (holding that “[t]he Federal
Government has created an elaborate procedural mechanism designed to help both the government
and custodial parents to secure [child support payments]”).
270. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2012). A list of the most wanted Deadbeat Parents is kept by the Office
of the Inspector General of the U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services. See OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., Status of Deadbeats: Wanted Deadbeats,
https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/child-support-enforcement/wanted.asp (last visited Aug. 24, 2020).
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support.271 But federal involvement comes at a cost, which is more than simply
the loss of state autonomy. Arguably, that states have focused for decades on
how best to comply with federal mandates so as to maximize federal
entitlements. The dilemma this poses is that often states have not focused on the
practical realities of child support, issues such as developing effective guidelines
that accommodate joint physical custody.272 But most of all, states have failed
to provide the type of court-ordered services that accompany child custody
orders. This failure results in unfairness, litigation, and worst of all, it runs
counter to the best interest of the child.
C. Observations
Child support is firmly established as a federal-state effort, prompting a
number of observations concerning the purpose of child support and the manner
in which it is formulated and enforced at the state and federal levels.273
First, child support is a parental responsibility without regard to gender,
marital status, or economic background. One court summarized the rationality
of imposing consequences for nonpayment as punishing a parent for failing “to
live up to a most basic civic and even moral responsibility: the provision of
support to . . . children.”274
Second, because of the increasing federalization of child support any
determination of support must begin with the state statutory guidelines. They
are presumptively correct and any rebuttal of the amounts produced warrants
written findings of extraordinary circumstances.275 States utilize one of three
primary guideline formulations and each is designed to provide a presumptive
amount of support that can then be rebutted, supplemented, or modified in
accordance with state procedures. And while premarital and marital agreement
between adults may determine the parameters of adult duties, such an agreement
may not adversely affect the rights of a child or alter the presumptive authority
of state support guidelines.276 Agreements may be advantageous in enforcing,

271. See, e.g., Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3568 (1980)
(codified in parts of 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
272. See Jo Michelle Beld & Len Biernat, Federal Intent for State Child Support Guidelines:
Income Shares, Cost Shares, and the Realities of Shared Parenting, 37 FAM. L. Q. 165, 194 (2003).
273. See, e.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (describing the interlocking set of
cooperative federal-state programs fashioned to collect child support).
274. Eunique v. Powell, 302 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2002).
275. See Dudgeon v. Dudgeon, 318 S.W.3d 106, 107 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).
276. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Best, 901 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that
premarital agreements cannot impair child support or child custody rights); see also PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.07(2)(d) (“[T]he
parents have agreed to a greater amount, or the parents have agreed to a lesser amount and their
agreement has been reviewed and approved by the court[.]”); see also id. § 3.13.
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for example, private agreements that enhance support obligations, such as
paying for college or graduate school.277
Third, while today’s child custody determinations most often begin with adult
parents aided in arriving at a custody agreement—parenting plan—that
maximizes their involvement and future enforcement, the same is not true with
child support. “Balancing has not previously been systematically applied in the
development of child-support rules and formulas.”278 Yet, the American Law
Institute proposes a child support structure by which the parties may work
toward compromise utilizing concrete objectives.279 These objectives include:
first, each parent’s income should be shared to provide the child with a minimum
standard of living whereby one parent’s standard of living is not grossly inferior
to that of the other;280 second, that the child fairly share in important life
opportunities without causing either parent to be treated unfairly;281 and third,
that the support obligation be comprehensible, readily enforceable and
modifiable, and minimize conflict between the parents.282
Fourth, too often we are locked in language that has become outdated by the
movement towards adoption of joint physical custody. For example, the ALI
child support objectives are based in a formulaic support guideline. The ALI
adopts one derived from that used in Massachusetts.283 The formula balances
“the precise extent to which the higher-income parent enjoys a higher standard
of living that the other parent . . . [based on] the relative strength of competing
interests.”284 Yet throughout its comments on the child support guideline, the
ALI is locked in language that addresses residential parent versus nonresidential
parent, obligor and obligee. For example: “The base is an estimate of the
percentage of obligor income that will ensure all parties the same standard of
living when the residential parent otherwise has income equal to that of the
obligor parent.”285 When addressing joint custody parents (dual resident
parents),286 the American Law Institute retains the child support formula
guideline but admits that child expenditures are greater now that there are two
households. It also cautions that the child support award should minimize any
distinction in the child’s standard of living in either of the two different

277. See, e.g., Shortt v. Damron, 649 S.E.2d 283 (W. Va. 2007) (finding that a father’s
agreement to pay for college was enforceable).
278. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, § I5 II.
279. Id. § 3.04.
280. Id. § 3.04(1).
281. Id. § 3.04(2)–(6).
282. Id. § 3.04(7)–(9).
283. Id. § 3.05 cmt. (b).
284. Id. § 3.04 cmt. (d).
285. Id. § 3.05 cmt. (b).
286. Defined as dual resident parents who, share primary residential responsibility for a child,
each providing a residence substantially equivalent to a primary residence. See id. § 3.02 cmt. e.
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households.287 And then the ALI offers as a proper modification of the stated
formula a support award based on the degree of “each parent’s percentage of
residential responsibility.”288 Such a process is litigious, lengthy, and
unnecessary. It would be better that the guideline be a part of a mediated process
initiated by the court, which addresses from the start all unique features of child
custody and child support. One impacts the other and both benefit from a
process similar to that which produces a good parenting plan.
IV. CONCLUSION
Child custody and child support share a common goal, the best interest of the
child. But child custody determinations have benefitted from progressive
understanding of the fundamental rights of each parent, the avoidance of
stereotypes such as gender or sexual orientation, and the emergence of
parenthood through assisted reproductive technology. Partially as a result of this
understanding, child custody has increasingly drifted towards a joint
arrangement crafted by parents with the assistance of court-ordered services.
This joint arrangement is called a parenting plan by the American Law Institute.
Most importantly, this plan is drafted with the professional assistance, persons
familiar with the issues and able to offer constructive proposals outside the
litigious atmosphere of court hearings.
Child support awards would benefit from similar professional assistance, not
in a rebuttal of child support guidelines, but rather working with the guidelines
to accommodate the issues that do and may arise. Arguably, the federalization
of child support has dulled state efforts to better respond to the challenges posed
by joint physical custody arrangements. Federalization is a given, as are the
guidelines which it mandates. But what may be done now is to provide a better
process by which to establish a fair and just child support order. This process
would be similar to that used to draft a child custody parenting plan.

287. Id. § 3.08(1)(c).
288. Id. § 3.08 cmt. (d).
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